What You Need to Know to Set Up a Simple Firewall in Linux

If you connect an internal network directly to the Internet, you have to make sure that every system on the internal network is properly secured — which can be nearly impossible, because a single careless user can render the entire internal network vulnerable.

The firewall runs software on your Linux system that examines the network packets arriving at its network interfaces and then takes appropriate action based on a set of rules. The idea is to define these rules so that they allow only authorized network traffic to flow between the two interfaces. Configuring the firewall involves setting up the rules properly. A configuration strategy is to reject all network traffic and then enable only a limited set of network packets to go through the firewall. The authorized network traffic would include the connections necessary to enable internal users to do things such as visit websites and receive electronic mail.

To be useful at protecting your Linux system, a firewall must have the following general characteristics:

• It must control the flow of packets between the Internet and the internal network.
• It must not provide dynamic routing because dynamic routing tables are subject to route spoofing — the use of fake routes by intruders. Instead, the firewall uses static routing tables (which you can set up with the route command on Linux systems).
• It must not allow any external user to log in as root. That way, even if the firewall system is compromised, the intruder is blocked from using root privileges from a remote login.
• It must be kept in a physically secure location.
• It must distinguish between packets that come from the Internet and packets that come from the internal protected network. This feature allows the firewall to reject packets that come from the Internet but have the IP address of a trusted system on the internal network.
• It acts as the SMTP mail gateway for the internal network. Set up the sendmail software so that all outgoing mail appears to come from the firewall system.
• Its user accounts are limited to a few user accounts for those internal users who need access to external systems. External users who need access to the internal network should use SSH for remote login.
• It keeps a log of all system activities, such as successful and unsuccessful login attempts.
• It provides DNS name-lookup service to the outside world to resolve any host names that are known to the outside world.
• It provides good performance so that it doesn’t hinder internal users’ access to specific Internet services (such as HTTP and FTP).

• Packet filter firewall: This simple firewall uses a router capable of filtering (blocking or allowing) packets according to various characteristics, including the source and destination IP addresses, the network protocol (TCP or UDP), and the source and destination port numbers. Packet filter firewalls are usually placed at the outermost boundary with an untrusted network, and they form the first line of defense. An example of a packet filter firewall is a network router that employs filter rules to screen network traffic.

Packet filter firewalls are fast and flexible, but they can’t prevent attacks that exploit application-specific vulnerabilities or functions. They can log only a minimal amount of information, such as source IP address, destination IP address, and traffic type. Also, they’re vulnerable to attacks and exploits that take advantage of flaws within the TCP/IP protocol, such as IP address spoofing, which involves altering the address information in network packets to make them appear to come from a trusted IP address.

• Stateful inspection firewall: This type of firewall keeps track of the network connections that network applications are using. When an application on an internal system uses a network connection to create a session with a remote system, a port is also opened on the internal system. This port receives network traffic from the remote system. For successful connections, packet filter firewalls must permit incoming packets from the remote system.

Opening many ports to incoming traffic creates a risk of intrusion by unauthorized users who abuse the expected conventions of network protocols such as TCP. Stateful inspection firewalls solve this problem by creating a table of outbound network connections, along with each session’s corresponding internal port. Then this state table is used to validate any inbound packets. This stateful inspection is more secure than a packet filter because it tracks internal ports individually rather than opening all internal ports for external access.

• Application-proxy gateway firewall: This firewall acts as an intermediary between internal applications on a Linux system that attempt to communicate with external servers such as a web server. A web proxy receives requests for external web pages from web browser clients running inside the firewall and relays them to the exterior web server as though the firewall was the requesting web client. The external web server responds to the firewall, and the firewall forwards the response to the inside client as though the firewall was the web server. No direct network connection is ever made from the inside client host to the external web server.

Application-proxy gateway firewalls have some advantages over packet filter firewalls and stateful inspection firewalls. First, application-proxy gateway firewalls examine the entire network packet rather than only the network addresses and ports, which enables these firewalls to provide more extensive logging capabilities than packet filters or stateful inspection firewalls.

Another advantage is that application-proxy gateway firewalls can authenticate users directly, whereas packet filter firewalls and stateful inspection firewalls normally authenticate users on the basis of the IP address of the system (that is, source, destination, and protocol type). Given that network addresses can be easily spoofed, the authentication capabilities of application-proxy gateway firewalls are superior to those found in packet filter and stateful inspection firewalls.

The advanced functionality of application-proxy gateway firewalls, however, results in some disadvantages compared with packet filter or stateful inspection firewalls:

Because of the full packet awareness found in application-proxy gateways, the firewall is forced to spend significant time reading and interpreting each packet. Therefore, application-proxy gateway firewalls generally aren’t well suited to high-bandwidth or real-time applications. To reduce the load on the firewall, a dedicated proxy server can be used to secure less time-sensitive services, such as email and most web traffic.

Application-proxy gateway firewalls are often limited in terms of support for new network applications and protocols. An individual application-specific proxy agent is required for each type of network traffic that needs to go through the firewall. Most vendors of application-proxy gateways provide generic proxy agents to support undefined network protocols or applications. Those generic agents, however, tend to negate many of the strengths of the application-proxy gateway architecture; they simply allow traffic to tunnel through the firewall.

In a large organization, you may also have to isolate smaller internal networks from the corporate network. You can set up such internal firewalls the same way that you set up Internet firewalls.